British involvement in Middle East politics can be traced to long before the First World War when its economic and strategic interests appeared to be the main reason for the involvement. The emergence of the newly created Israeli state, following the Balfour Declaration, marked the beginning of the Palestinian refugee crisis. Between 1948 and 1956, historical None of these scholars have tried to analyse the motives behind continued British involvement in humanitarian aid for Palestinian refugees -the crisis which lingers long after the end of the British Empire in the Middle East. This paper discusses this topic with a focus on refugees from the 1967 war and attempts to explain the reasons for continuation of British aid from an historical perspective. This research was based on historical document analysis and the extraction of archival sources from The National Archive (TNA) in London.
Introduction
In the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the plight of the Palestinian refugees worsened. The refugee population increased dramatically as a result of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and Golan Heights. Indeed, with the emergence of Washington and Kremlin influences in the region in the 1960's, the British role seemed irrelevant. However, UN Resolution 242 which ended the war, was tabled by the UK and it introduced a new debate about the British approach to and role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 3 In fact, any action taken by the British during the war could be interpreted as a strategy to protect British interest in the Middle East region, especially in the Arab world. This paper will discuss two important issues arising from the 1967 war. First, that the continued British contribution of humanitarian aids towards the Palestinian refugees proves that the British role in Middle East politics remains important. Secondly, the significance of the aid could be interpreted as a diplomatic strategy to preserve British influence in the region and portray a "trusted friendly" image to the Arabs. The argument is supported by the following Foreign Office document which states:
Lord Caradon has advised that, whatever is done towards finding a long term solution of the refugee problem in the Middle East, we should need to make a substantial increase in our contribution to UNRWA's normal budget in 1968. He argues that there could be no greater need on the humanitarian side and that increased contribution would obviously also be politically very valuable. We have made considerable progress in improving Anglo/Arab relations since they reached their nadir for this decade immediately after the June War. The living conditions of the Palestinian refugees at the camps after the war was very grim. In the Jordan Valley for example, in December 1967, the six camps (Wahadna, Maadi, Damyia, Karamah, Shunnah and Ghor Nimrin) were overcrowded due to the influx of 60,000 new refugees. At Ghor Nimrin 14,500 new refugees arrived with an additional 300 refugees who crossed the bridges at Allenby, Sharat and Damyia during the war. This was due to Israel's brutal campaign to expel them from their land such as the village of An-Nusseirat who were exiled to Um Sharat in early December 1967.
from the Standing Conference of British Organization for Aid to Refugees (SCBOAR), in August 1968, disclosed that the quality of food intake among 60,000 refugees was unhealthy. Cases of malnutrition amongst refugees increased while aid agencies were unable to take effective action due to the lack of funds.
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Consequently, the malnutrition problem created an outbreak of diseases among refugees such as hypoprotenemia, scurvy, beri-beri, cheilosis, tuberculosis and arikoflavinosis.
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Life expectancy also decreased to an average age of 35 years.
FCO reports from 1967 show that it was feared that the bad conditions would also cause psychological trauma leading to deterioration of moral standards. The files enclose a statement from the Young Mens' Christian Association (YMCA), dated 1950, that states:
The condition of the refugee physically is fair for the Near East, as most receive food, clothing, shelter and medical care. But the moral standards of these people after 20 months of poverty and what is more, inactivity is very low.
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Despite the grim condition of the refugees, these camps were also exposed to regular attack by the Israeli forces. According to the report by the British Red Cross Representative, several refugee camps under the supervision of UNRWA were attacked by the Israelis forces, especially the UNRWA's camps at Rafah and Gaza, in June 1967. 20 
TheTragedy of the 1967 Refugees and British Humanitarian Aid
After the 1967 war, the British continuously contributed humanitarian aid directly to the refugees and to the shelter countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Syria. The aid, especially financial assistance, also came from British Non Government Organizations (NGO) with strong support from the government. The priority of the aid was focused on assisting the new refugees to become independent under the "self supporting program" in their new settlements, in the neighbouring Arab countries.
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From 1948 to 1967, the British Government emerged as the second highest financial contributor to the UNRWA (after America) and also to the NGOs such as Red Cross International. For example, up until 1967 UNRWA received more than USD 100 million from the British Government for their operations in the refugee camps.
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While for the 1968 financial year, the British government announced that USD 5 million would be donated of which 55 percent would be spent on the development of education, training schemes, infrastructure and health care services. 23 During the war, the British agreed to contribute an additional USD 500,000 to the UNRWA for emergency relief. This excluded other humanitarian aid such as tents and medicine which was brought directly from the British military base in Cyprus.
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Other than direct contributions to the UN relief agency, the British also assisted their Arab allies who faced the flood of Palestinian refugees immediately after the war. One of the biggest recipients of British aid was Jordan. Since the 1967 war, huge numbers of refugees were exiled to Jordan. The Jordanian government was unable to absorb the new refugees after the major infrastructure of the kingdom was badly destroyed by Israelis during the war. Thus, the British cabinet agreed to release financial assistance of £500,000 to Jordan immediately after the war to rebuild their basic infrastructures. 25 Additionally, the British cabinet also approved delivery of humanitarian stuff such as blankets and tents, worth more than £20 million for the refugees through the Jordanian Government in 1967.
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A special committee called The British Relief Fund for Jordan was set up to administer and monitor all this aid. The committee comprised representatives from the British NGOs, Jordanian Government officers and Foreign Office representatives.
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The British Government also gave great support to Britain's NGOs and volunteer organiSations to assist the Palestinian refugees. In early 1962, with the full support of the British Government, the UNRWA's liaison group, Standing Conference of British Organizations for Aid to Refugees (SCBOFR), was formed. The main objective of this group was to be the main body for monitoring and coordinating all the British NGOs' assistance to the refugees with a close co-operation with UNRWA. This included a project to raise a fund of more than £34,000 yearly to facilitate the education and vocational activities of the refugees through the establishment of The UNRWA Vocational Training Centre. For example, SCBOFR successfully raised more than £35,000 in 1962 and £38,500 in 1963 which was given to support the UNRWA operation. In 1966, SCBOFR launched the European Campaign for World Refugees 1966 which collected more than £38,500 for the UNRWA. SCBOFR also contributed physical humanitarian aid such as tents for the refugees. During the June 1967 war, they contributed tents to the UNRWA camps at East Jordan which were occupied by more than 10,000 refugees. The cost of providing the tents was covered from the humanitarian campaign run by SCBOFR members through The AngloArab Association who collected more than £77,000. At the same time its other members, like Disasters Emergency Committee, collected more than £10,000 (through a campaign on television) and an appeal by The Times, on 15 June 1967, collected more than £12,500.
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The British Government gave great support to the British NGOs to assist the Palestinian refugees in the 1967 war through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Overseas Development. Up to June 1967, most of these NGOs worked closely with the Government to raise a donation for the victims of the war. Oxfam, for example, collected shirts and foodstuff valued at more then £9,000 and 10 huge tents worth £3000 each, which were delivered from Greece to the Palestinians. Christian Aid raised a donation of £3000 and the United Nation Association, Citizenship, successfully raised more than £9000 for the refugees. The total value of humanitarian aid from the British NGOs up to 6 June 1967, including tents, food stuff, shirts and medicine was more than £143,743. It is undeniable that the British continued to provide humanitarian aid to the Palestinian refugees after the 1967 war. However, in certain aspects of the assistance there was a debate and curiosity over Britain's motives. The war itself gave a great impact on the British image in the Middle East. For example, the British proposal for Resolution 242 generated a general assumption that Britain was either neutral or in favour of Israel.
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After the war, in order to rebuild the image of a "trusted friend" of the Arabs, Britain had to formulate and moderate its reaction and policy to be seen favourably by the Arabs. This included paying attention to Palestinian refugee issues. The assistance on the refugees had to be based on the vital consideration of protecting British interest in the Arab world. Among the vital interests for the British at that time were oil and strategic and political interests. destruction of her basic infrastructures but at the same time experiencing political instability.
Having lost the war, the image of King Hussein deteriorated. There was dissatisfaction amongst the people and in the army particularly with his failure to equip the army with new technology of weapons compared with Israel. Hussein's image as the "Protector of the Muslim's Holy City" (Baitul Maqdis) was also destroyed after the occupation of East Jerusalem by Israel in the war. Worse was the flooding of Jordan with Palestinian refugees to the extent that they formed the majority of population in Jordan. These refugees, through the Palestinian fedayyeen, were a great threat to Hussein's leadership. As stated in FCO papers: "Fedayeen, the whole movement is a cancer in the body of Jordan." 33 Clearly, the hatred among fedayeen against King Hussein and his ancestors increased after the war. The report by the British Council in Jerusalem describes:
The King Hussein's grandfather is blamed for causing the refugee problem by calling on the Arabs of Jaffa, Haifa and elsewhere to forsake their homes and for giving up Ramlah and Lydda without a fight. King Hussein himself is blamed for having given preference to the East Bank over the West Bank during the period they were united under his rule; for giving the West Bank into the hands of Israel by his ill-fated attack on the later in 1967. And now for trying to liquidate the fedayeen, the only people who can be said to represent the West Bank personally... perhaps because of the Israeli presence, there has been little public demonstration of this anti Hussein feeling.
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The fedayeen operation base was at the refugee camps in Jordan. The members of these organisations were the Palestinian refugees and they received huge support from Palestinian sympathisers, including Jordanians. It was very important for the British to handle the refugee issues wisely in order to restore Jordanian support to the king whilst at the same time liquidating the threat from the fedayeen. Even though Britain realised that the threat of fedayeen was very dangerous to its ally in Jordan, it admitted that it was not possible to assist the king directly against his opponents. As stated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Brown, to the Prime Minister: "There is no way in which we (UK) can intervene directly in Jordan to help King Hussein." 37 Indeed, any direct assistance from London after the war to liquidate the fedayeen threat would be interpreted as the king associating himself with the UK, the US and Israel against his Arab brothers. This could mobilise greater opposition towards the leadership of the palace.
Instead of giving direct assistance to King Hussein, the British decided to use other ways to stabilise Jordanian politics and restore the power of the palace against the fedayeen after the war. Since the fedayeen movements deeply influenced the majority of the Palestinian refugees in the camps, the best way was for London to "assist" directly the refugees at the camps located in Jordan. The main objective was to reduce the support of the refugees towards fedayeen by mobilising their economic activities for a better living condition. And this is one of the major reasons why Britain gave a very high priority on humanitarian aid to the Palestinian refugees. The Foreign Office's document justified this argument:
There is a risk that representations from us might prejudice the position of King Hussein. The only effective way in which King Hussein could be helped from outside (UK) would be if the "new" refugee problem could be made less acute since it is out of frustration and disappointment of the "new" refugees that the fedayeen have been able to develop their support in Jordan. However, despite the "humanitarian" aid from Britain, London believed that its motives could be achieved effectively only with the help of Tel Aviv.
The only measure which could be taken quickly to help the "new refugees" would be if the Israelis could be persuaded to have them back on the West Bank -the survival of the Hashemite regime is in their interest. To raise standard of living in the occupied territories among refugees. Example of project in vocational training center which providing the skills necessary for the industrialization of the occupied territories, which in turn would lead to greater employment opportunities there. In the center, each can provide employment for 300 people. Notes and Documents (1915-1967) , International Association of Democratic Lawyers, Brussels.
the Israelis to return to their villages. At the beginning, the British supported the demands of the UN and the international community for the right of these DPs to return to their villages unconditionally. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sir George Thomson, stated in July 1967:
Since the movement of the refugees first began in the wake of the recent hostilities, we have expressed to the Israel government in the strongest terms first our concern that they should avoid actions which would encourage an exodus from occupied territories and later our view that they (Israel) should do all in their power to facilitate the refugee return. We have made a point in our recent dealings with the Israeli government of expressing to them our disappointment and concern at what has appeared to be their bureaucratic obstraction of the return of the refugees and have pointed out to them that there is no surer way of losing world sympathy for Israel than to be obstructive in this issue. We have had their assurance that they will work to establish humane conditions for the refugees to return.
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Thomson's statement clearly indicated British support for the international community's demand for Israel to facilitate return of the refugees unconditionally after the war. However, Israel was willing to allow only 15,000 out of 170,000 DPs to return. Ironically, the decision made by Israel was then supported by the British as Thomson later stated:
It would however be unrealistic to expect all those who have fled (Palestinian refugees) to return and so we must accept that a proportion of the new arrivals on the East Bank will be likely to stay there. 44 Clearly, the humanitarian aid from Britain to the refugees was not solely based on "humanitarian consciousness." At least, in the motive of preserving King Hussein's political power after the war and its unclear attitude towards the right of the refugees to return home or to receive compensation, London's generosity could be questioned. Britain's action has to be seen in the context of "image purification" as a key strategy to preserve London's interest in the Arab World, after its image was tarnished in the 1967 war. However, the fact was that this "camouflage" of political interest with a humanitarian generosity would not produce long-term benefit for peace and stability in the Middle East. 
Conclusion
After the Suez War of 1956, Middle East observers presumed that British influences in the region's politics would deteriorate. The resignation of Sir Anthony Eden, following Suez, marked the end of the British "empire" in the Middle East after decades of influence and control. Prior to the 1967 war, as the Cold War intensified, America and the Soviet Union emerged as the dominant world powers competing in the region. Hence, the British role in Middle East politics became less significant. However, due to the competition between the superpowers via their proxies in the Middle East, London then appeared as the neutral power and the best negotiator in the conflict. Resolution 242, tabled by London, was a significant symbol of the British role and influence using a different form of diplomatic strategy during the conflict.
The general assumption that British influence in the Middle East conflict in 1967 was less important could no longer be accepted. Britain's vital role in the conflict is also demonstrated through her continued aid contribution to the Palestinian refugees. London was the second largest contributor to the UNRWA's fund. The sincerity of its humanitarian donation was however questioned and led to a political debate. Finally, this paper justifies that the "End of the British Empire" in the Middle East did not end Britain's political and economic agenda in the Middle East conflict, and these hidden agendas are reflected in its continued aid to the refugees of 1967 Middle East humanitarian tragedy.
